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ABSTRACT Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) has emerged as a significant advancement for Internet
and mobile networks with various public safety network applications. An important use of IoT-based
solutions is its application in post-disaster management, where the traditional telecommunication systems
may be either completely or partially damaged. Since enabling technologies have restricted authentication
privileges for mobile users, in this paper, a strategy of mobile-sink is introduced for the extension of
user authentication over cloud-based environments. A seamless secure authentication and key agreement
(S-SAKA) approach using bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems is presented. It is shown that
the proposed S-SAKA approach satisfies the security properties, and as well as being resilient to node-
capture attacks, it also resists significant numbers of other well-known potential attacks related with data
confidentiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user anonymity, password guessing, and key
impersonation.Moreover, the proposed approach can provide a seamless connectivity through authentication
over wireless sensor networks to alleviate the computation and communication cost constraints in the system.
In addition, using Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic, it is demonstrated that the proposed S-SAKA framework
offers proper mutual authentication and session key agreement between the mobile-sink and the base station.
INDEX TERMS Secure public safety networks, Internet of Things, cloud systems, session-key agreement,
bilinear pairing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm where
objects become part of the Internet. It has converged
technologies in terms of sensing, computing, information
processing, networking and controlling intelligent technolo-
gies [1], [2]. Among the technologies converged we can
count wireless sensor networks (WSNs), intelligent sensing,
remote sensing, radio frequency identification (RFID), near
field communications (NFC), low-energy wireless commu-
nications, and cloud computing. The technologies involved
have particular applications in public safety as well as other
domains such as healthmonitoring, smart homes and environ-
ments, smart cities, smart grid, and various types of pervasive
systems [3].
WSNs are composed of base-stations and numerous low
cost mobility nodes which have restricted resources, such as
communication, storage and computation cost. Each mobil-
ity node has its own sensing-unit, data-processing unit,
module for short-range communication and power-supply
unit [9]. Recently, WSNs have had its own prominence in
various application fields, namely military (missile target
tracking / detection system), environment (hazardous detec-
tion), biomedical (healthmonitoring and patient tracking) and
building (smart-homing and threat detection). Since WSNs
have limited power-supply unit for the mobility nodes, some
researchers [7], [8] have introduced the technique of mobile-
sink in theWSNs for the extension of network lifetime. Since
the mobility nodes transmit the confidential data via wireless
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channels, any user may act as an adversary to overhear /
tamper the confidential data being transmitted on the WSNs.
Lately, Cloud Computing (CC) techniques have been further
emerged as well with the WSNs’ for the purposes of storage
and data access at any time over the Internet [3], [4]. In the
cloud, the user can find the set of hardware devices, network
connections, storage spaces, data services and application
interfaces that are easily accessed over the Internet.
IoT architecture can be implemented as either Internet
centric or object centric. The former aims at provision-
ing services within the Internet, where data are contributed
by objects and vendors who deterministically deploy these
objects, whereas the latter aims at provisioning services
via network of smart objects. Scalability and cost effi-
ciency of IoT services can be achieved by the integration
of cloud-computing into the IoT architecture, i.e., cloud-
centric IoT [50]. In a cloud-centric IoT framework, sensors
provide their sensed data to a storage cloud as a service,
which then undergoes data analytics and data mining tools
for information retrieval and knowledge discovery [50].
With the evolution of IoT, the global data networks
are interconnected and accessed over CC networking sys-
tems [4], [5]. As the sensing data are transmitted over public
networks, the adversary can easily intercept the exchange of
data between the users and the remote servers. This would
cause various possible attacks, such as replay, key imperson-
ation, stolen verifier, etc. [14], [15]. As the CC has become
a prominent domain for secure authentication, WSNs are in
high demands of security schemes for the purpose of user
authentication, authorization and accounting while the cloud
services are being accessed by the legitimate users.
In literature, the gateway/base-station based authentication
schemes have provided the lightweight authentication for
the enrichment of security properties [10]–[22]. As a result,
WSNs presume the gateway/base-station as imperative part
to sense the real-time data over insecure networks. In this
paper, users are referred as mobile-sink. In a state of proper
access towards the sensor-node, the mobile-sink should com-
plete the proper registration to establish an authorized session
between the sensor-node and the base-station. In addition,
the successful establishment of this communication can only
be achieved through the satisfaction of mutual authentica-
tion and session-key agreement. Generally, the authentication
schemes try to satisfy all the security properties of authentica-
tion and key protocol (AKA), such as mutual authentication,
session key agreement, user anonymity, etc [14]. The analyses
performed on the existing studies show that several authen-
tication schemes are still susceptible for various potential
attacks, such as privileged-insider, key impersonation, stolen
smart-card etc. As a result, this paper presents a seamless
secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) using
bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems. The objec-
tive of this framework is to provide mutual authentication,
session-key agreement, data confidentiality, user anonymity,
intractability and resilient to node-capture attack, key imper-
sonation, replay, stolen smart card, and privileged-insider.
In order to ease the computation and communication over-
head, the authentication phase of S-SAKA does not invoke
the base-station to authenticate the mobile-sink and sensor-
node; and thus the S-SAKA framework is more flexible than
the three-party authentication scheme when mobile-sink is
employed in the Cloud WSNs.
Since the pairwise keys are randomly distributed,
the adversary may have a chance to obtain a common
session-key to compromise the nodes. Das et al. [23] and
He [24] presented a dynamic-identity based authentication
scheme to resist the attacks, like privileged-insider and
key-compromise. However, Das et al. and He’s approaches
are still vulnerable to the potential attack of node-capture.
For the enhancement of security efficiency, Deebak [17],
Turkanović et al. [18], Farash et al. [19], Das et al. [20],
Amin and Biswas [21] and Srinivas et al. [22] have proposed
lightweight user authentication schemes. However, their
authentication schemes fail to mitigate the computation and
communication efficiency of the network systems as they
invoke the base-station authentication. This paper proposes
the S-SAKA framework, which does not only to improve
data security while using the mobile-sink in the WSNs, but
also provides seamless connectivity over WSNs to reduce the
computation and communication overhead.
The major contributions of S-SAKA framework are as
follows:
1. The existing authentication schemes [17]–[22] are thor-
oughly analyzed to show various susceptibilities, such
as privileged-insider, key impersonation, denial of ser-
vice and password guessing.
2. To address the security weaknesses of existing
schemes [17]–[24], a lightweight S-SAKA framework
is proposed that holds all the originalmerits of the exist-
ing schemes [17]–[22] to resist the potential attacks.
3. To strengthen the proposed S-SAKA framework, a for-
mal security analysis is performed using Burrows–
Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic [25]. Besides, the infor-
mal analysis is presented to claim that the proposed
S-SAKA framework can be resilient to the attacks,
which has not been analyzed in the literature to date.
4. Lastly, an experimental analysis is performed using
MIRACLE C/C++ library to examine the computa-
tion and communication overhead of existing and pro-
posed authentication frameworks. The evaluation result
proves that the proposed S-SAKA framework provides
less overhead as compared to existing authentication
schemes.
When detailed analysis is carried out with formal and infor-
mal verifications, it is observed that the proposed S-SAKA
scheme provides less communication overhead in compari-
son with other existing authentication schemes in the litera-
ture [17]–[22].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the existing secure authentication schemes. Section III
illustrates an architecture of hierarchical WSNs and dis-
courses the mathematical assumption model using bilinear
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pairing. Section IV presents seamless secure authentication
and key agreement (S-SAKA) framework along with the
security analysis. Section V shows the verification proof.
Section VI compares the performance efficiency of proposed
and existing authentication schemes. Finally, Section VII
concludes this study
II. RELATED WORKS
Various natural or man-made disasters such as earthquakes,
floods, tsunamis, nuclear power plant explosions cost sig-
nificantly in terms of assets/infrastructure damage and more
importantly human lives. The WSN based systems such as
IoT solutions can help us to save lives since healthy commu-
nication and accurate information can make a real difference
between life and death for those who are in the areas affected
by the disasters. The exposure of sensitive information or sim-
ilar attacks on confidentiality/integrity of information, and/or
availability of resources can become an additional disaster in
case proper countermeasures are not planned carefully.
With the modernization of the public safety communica-
tions, and the changes in application areas as well as new
technologies introduced such as wearables, wireless body
area networks, and variety of tracking devices that can be
carried by responders such as rescue teams, fire fighters,
and police, the IoT is expected to form a solid infrastruc-
ture for public safety applications [4]. Furthermore, although
the enhancements especially in performance improvements
of 3GPP LTE-A look very promising, during disaster situa-
tions these infrastructures can also be damaged or out of ser-
vice [5]. There are some studies focussing on secure wireless
powered device-to-device (D2D) communication in case the
infrastructure is not available or partially functional [6]. How-
ever IoT based public safety networks (PSNs) are expected to
have better availability in disaster scenarios since the compu-
tation is known to be more towards the distributed fashion.
Nowadays, sensor nodes are mostly used to sense the
continuous data, event detection in real time environment
and actuators control. These features are particularly useful
for public safety applications. Specifically, micro sensing
and seamless wireless connectivity became the promising
technologies for various information and communication
domains. These technologies are further extending for the
classical categories, such as bio chemical processing, space
exploration and disaster environment [9]. In order to offer
better services to the users in WSNs, security is an important
concern as the data transmission is performed over public
networks [10]–[13] with the restrictions as follows:
1. Sensors are easily render to failure
2. Topologies of sensor networks change often
3. Sensor networks always prefer broadcast paradigms,
but most of the Ad-hoc networks are point-to-point
communication
4. Sensors have limited power, computation and storage
WSNs are one of the essential components of the infras-
tructures employed for establishment of IoT based pub-
lic safety applications. Recently, security issues in WSNs
have gained much attention of the researchers not only
to satisfy the security properties of authentication and
key agreement (AKA) protocol but also to mitigate the
computation and communication cost of the system. For
the achievement of minimum overhead, several lightweight
authentication schemes have been proposed [26]–[30].
Watro et al. [35] proposed the lightweight two-factor user
authentication based on RSA cryptosystem for WSNs. How-
ever, the Watro et al. scheme [35] is vulnerable to replay,
denial of service and key impersonation attacks [27]–[31].
Wong et al. [16] presented a lightweight user authentication
scheme for WSNs, which only demands the computation
of a hashing function. Later on, Srinivas et al. [22] show
that the Wong et al. scheme [35] is vulnerable to stolen ver-
ifier and many logged-in users with the same login iden-
tity attack [27]–[31]. Tseng et al. [29] improved the version
of Wong et al., which does not offer mutual authentication
between the base-station and sensor-node [28]. To overcome
the security weakness of mutual authentication, Lee [30]
presented a novel password based dynamic user authentica-
tion scheme, which also fails to satisfy mutual authentication
between the base-station and the sensor-node [28].
Eschenauer and Gligor [32] presented a random based pre-
distribution keymechanism to provide an initial trust between
the sensor nodes. In random based key pre-distribution
scheme, a key is randomly chosen from a key-pool and stored
in the sensor node before it is deployed in the field. As a
consequence, there are some certainties to have one common
key for more than one sensor node. Chan et al. [33] improved
this authentication scheme as two-key pre-distribution that
has random pairwise-key and q-composite based key pre-
distribution. Rasheed and Mahapatra [34] proposed a three-
tier authentication scheme to provide a pairwise key
establishment between the mobile-sink and the sensor-
node. Nonetheless, the schemes, such as Chan et al. and
Rasheed et al. have some serious security issues, namely
user anonymity, intractability, privileged-insider and imper-
sonation attack. Watro et al. [35] proposed an authentication
scheme using Diffie-Hellman and RSA protocol as TinyPK
scheme. But then, the TinyPK scheme is still suscepti-
ble to the masquerade attack [20]. To address this issue,
Das et al. [20] introduced a two-factor user authentication
scheme.
Chen et al. [37] shown that the Das et al. scheme is
unsuccessful to provide the mutual authentication between
the mobile-sinks and the sensor-nodes. To overcome the
security weakness of Das et al. [23], Chen and Shih [36] pro-
posed a novel authentication protocol for WSNs. He [24]
extended the authentication scheme of Das et al. [23] to
resist attacks such as privileged-insider and key imper-
sonation. Yuan et al. [28] presented a biometric based user
authentication scheme, which has a similar architecture of
Das et al. scheme [23] to satisfy the security properties of
AKA protocol. However, the Yuan et al. scheme is sus-
ceptible to denial of service (DoS) and node compromise
attack.
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Very few studies have focused on security issues for
mobile-sink inWSNs [34], [38], [46], [47]. Let us assume that
the adversary wants to impersonate as a legal mobile-sink to
sense the most sensitive information from sensor-node or pre-
tend as a legitimate sensor to upload incorrect or pseudo-
kind of messages to the mobile-sink. Owing to mobility in
the wireless environment, most of the existing authentication
schemes [20], [37], [39]–[41] are not well suited to authenti-
cate the sensor-node and mobile-sink. As secure authentica-
tion scheme is believed to be essential to the mobile-sink in
WSNs, this paper presents a novel seamless secure authen-
tication scheme to improve the security efficiencies of the
communication systems in terms of mutual authentication,
session key agreement, user anonymity and intractability.
The objectives of interaction and cooperation between the
objects and the things are to send the data over wireless
networks to signify the purpose of rapid development in
the emerging technologies of IoT and cloud computing. In
order to examine its common features and related discover-
ies, Stergiou et al. [48] presented a comparative study work,
which focuses on the security issues of both the technologies.
To provide the promising features, such as seamless inter-
action and interoperation, these technologies offer a smart
home concept to associate the embedded computing tech-
nologies and network coverage. To solve the security and
privacy preservation issues in the associated technologies,
Tao et al. [49] presented a model of multilayer cloud. How-
ever, their architectural model fails to examine the mutual
authentication and session key agreement between the com-
munication entities.
Unlike the previous studies, S-SAKA framework tackles
security issues, like data confidentiality, mutual authentica-
tion, session-key agreement, user anonymity, intractability
and resilient to node-capture, key impersonation, password
guessing and stolen smart-card attack for WSN configura-
tions using the mobile-sink while providing seamless connec-
tivity over WSNs to reduce the computation and communica-
tion overhead.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, an architecture of a hierarchical WSN and the
mathematical assumptions are discussed to signify the impor-
tance of the communication overhead and system security.
The former is considered to mitigate the communication cost
between the cluster head and the base station, whereby the
network lifetime can be extended. The latter is derived to
provide a better security mechanism to protect the system
under various potential attacks, such as privileged-insider,
replay, stolen smart-card and node capture. The important
notation used in proposed S-SAKA is illustrated in Table 1.
A. NETWORK MODEL
The purpose of mobile-sink is to collect and upload the
sensing data to the base-station. The principle use of mobile-
sink is to mitigate the communication cost between cluster-
head and base-station to enhance the network lifetime of the
TABLE 1. Important notation used in proposed S-SAKA.
FIGURE 1. Architecture of hierarchical Cloud Based WSNs.
WSNs and reduce the communication overhead. The major
disadvantage of the cloud-centric IoT is that it is usually based
on a flat-topology structure that causes many problems such
as scalability, increased traffic congestion among the nodes
much closer to the sink (known as the broadcast storm), and
an increase in overhead complexity. Therefore, clusteringwas
introduced to subdivide the broadcast area into smaller cluster
areas.
Many practical applications have had the model of hier-
archical WSNs’ for the purpose of power consumption; but
then this paper is aimed to design a seamless secure authenti-
cation and key agreement (S-SAKA) under the architecture of
hierarchical WSNs’ to provide one-time user authentication.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the networkmodel considered
in this study.
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Fig. 1 shows that the sensor nodes are connected to clus-
ter heads and cluster heads can communicate with each
other as well as mobile-sinks. Dual way arrows on mobile
sinks demonstrate the connections between sensor nodes and
mobile sinks. For the cases where the communication is not
within the range of the base station, the multi-hop data trans-
mission can be employed; however, this can deteriorate the
network lifetime and increase the communication overhead
significantly. Hence, mobile-sinks can be employed which
collects the sensed data from cluster head and upload it to
the base station. The principle motivation behind the usage
of mobile-sink in WSNs is to curtail the computation and
communication overhead between the cluster head and the
base station in order to enhance the WSNs lifetime.
B. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this subsection, the significance of Elliptic-Curve (EC)
and Bilinear Pairing (BP) are introduced. In comparison with
RSA, EC can provide better security level with minimum key
length size [33].
Elliptic Curve: Assume that p is a prime number and fp is
a finite integer field with modulus p. Hence, an elliptic curve
can be expressed as:
y2 = x3 + ax + b (mod p) (1)
where a, b ∈ fp to satisfy the equation 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0.
The scaling pointsQ (x, y), which satisfies the above equation
with ∞ is called as ‘‘Point at Infinity’’ to form an additive
cyclic group as:
E
[
fp
] = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ fp satisfy with y2 = x3 + ax
+ b (mod p) ∪∞}.
In this aspect, the scalar multiplication of Q (x, y) on EC
can be computed with the repetitive addition of n, i.e., P =
P + P + P . . . . . . . . . + P (n times). The details of the
assumptions can be found in [42] and [43]. Table 1 shows the
important notation used in proposed S-SAKA framework.
Bilinear Pairing: Assume thatG is a cyclic (additive) group
generated by a key-point PK and GT is a cyclic (multiplica-
tive) group. The group parameters, such as G and GT have
same prime order q. Also, assume eˆ : G × G → GT be a
computational bilinear mapping to satisfy the properties that
are as follows:
Bilinearity: Assume, X ,Y ∈ G and p, q ∈
Z∗q , eˆ (pX , qY ) = eˆ (X ,Y )pq ; also Z∗q = {k|1 ≤ k ≤ q− 1}.
Non-degenerate: Assume, X ∈ G, eˆ(X ,X ) 6= e, where e is
the identity of the group element GT .
Computability: Assume, eˆ(X ,Y ) be an existing algorithm
to compute the key-secrecy, for any X ,Y ∈ G.
Mathematical Assumptions: To prove the importance of
S-SAKA mechanism, some significant mathematical prob-
lems are derived from [44] and [45] that are as follows:
• Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Assume (P,Q) ∈ G
to find an integer n ∈ Z∗q such that Q = nP.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:Assume
P,Px,Py,Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z∗q to
determine xyP.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: Assume
P,Px,Py,Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z∗q to
determine whether zP = xyP or z = xy (mod q).
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem: Assume
P,Px,Py,Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z∗q to
determine eˆ(P,P)xyz.
IV. SEAMLESS SECURE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
AGREEMENT (S-SAKA) FRAMEWORK
In order to resolve the problem of security issue between
mobile-sink and cluster-head, a framework of S-SAKA is
proposed using bilinear-pairing. The S-SAKA framework is
composed of seven phases: Initialization; System registra-
tion; Cluster-Head Registration; Mobile-Sink Registration;
System Login; Authentication; Extraction of Sensing Data
and secret key update. The mechanisms of S-SAKA are
discussed in the following subsections.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, base station BSt performs an initialization to
generate the prerequisite parameters keys to publish the sys-
tem requirements. The procedural steps are as follows:
Step 1:Bilinear parameters are generated
{
q,P,G,GT , eˆ
}
,
where G is a cyclic additive group that generate prime order
integers q by P and eˆ : G×G→ GT is a bilinear group map.
Step 2: After the generation of bilinear parameters, BSt
chooses a random integer S ∈ Z∗q as its corresponding master
key to compute its public key ppub using ppub = S.P.
Step 3: After the generation of public key ppub, BSt deter-
mines two secure collision resistance hashing operatorH1 and
H2, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ is called as map to point hashing
functional operation and H2 : {0, 1}∗ is a one way secure
hashing.
Step 4: After the determination of hashing function, BSt
selects a symmetric encryption ESk (.) as the system encryp-
tion function.
Step 5: Lastly, BSt publishes the system parameters{
q,P,G,GT , eˆ,P, ppub,H1,H2,ESk (.)
}
and keeps the secret
parameters {S, x, y} confidentially.
The procedural steps can be represented as an illustrative
diagram as follows:
BSt performs an initialization
G generates
{
q by P
eˆ : G× G→ GT →
{
q,P,G,GT , eˆ
}
BSt chooses a random integer: S ∈ Z∗q
Compute−−−−−−→ ppub
ppub = S.P
BSt two secure collision resistance:
{
H1 : {0, 1}∗
H2 : {0, 1}∗
BSt
symmetric
encryp−−−−→ESk (.)
BSt
{
sys para : {q,P,G,GT , eˆ,P, ppub,H1,H2,ESk (.)}
secret para : {S, x, y}
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B. SYSTEM REGISTRATION PHASE
Prior to the deployment of the system, the available
mobile sinks and cluster-head should be registered with the
base-station. This phase is composed of two-parts, namely
cluster-head and mobile-sink registrations. In the S-SAKA
framework, cluster-head andmobile-sink have its own unique
identity, as CIDi and PIDj respectively. Moreover, the base-
station BSt has a database table DBS which is initialized to
maintain the non-compromised cluster-head.
1) CLUSTER-HEAD REGISTRATION
Before the deployment of cluster-head CHi In WSNs’,
the base-station integrate a unique identity CIDi to compute
S.H1(CIDi), and then, the base-station stores back the com-
puted value of S.H1(CIDi) in to the memory of CHi. Even-
tually, the base-station places CHi at an appropriate position
and insert a new identifier CIDi in the table of DBS.
The cluster-head registration can also be represented as an
illustrative diagram as follows:
BSt integrate CIDI
Compute−−−−−−→ S.H1(CIDi).
BSt
Store−−−−−→
S.H1(CIDi)
CHi.
DBS←−
CIDi
CHi.
2) MOBILE-SINK REGISTRATION
In this phase, the mobile-sink MS which is authorized would
try to store the random integer x into smart card. The proce-
dural steps are as follow:
Step 1: The authorized mobile-sink can freely opt an iden-
tity PIDj, a secret-key SK j and a random integer x ∈ Z∗q .
Afterwards, the mobile-sink determines H2(x ⊕ SK j) and
sends the message-request {PIDj,H2(x ⊕ SK j)} to BSt via a
secure communication channel.
Step 2:After receiving the message-request {PIDj,H2(x⊕
SK j)}, the BSt determines the following expressions:
Certifyj = S.H1(PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
); TSj = H2(PIDj ‖
y); Hj = H2(TSj); Vj = TSj ⊕ H2(x ⊕ SKj)); Aj =
H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
. Then, BSt delivers a smart-card which is
integrated of
{
Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj
}
to MS via a secure com-
munication channel.
Step 3: After receiving the smart-card, the authorized
mobile-sink stores back the random-integer x securely
in the smart-card. Now, the smart-card is integrated of{
Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x
}
.
The following illustrative diagram shows mobile-sink reg-
istration over base station.
MS :

PIDj
SK j
x ∈ Z∗q
Commit = H2(x ⊕ SK j)
MS
{PIDj,Commit}−−−−−−−−−−→ BSt
Certifyj = S.H1
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
))
TSj = H2
(
PIDj ‖ y
)
Hj = H2
(
TSj
)
Vj = TSj ⊕ H2(x ⊕ SKj))
Aj = H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
 : BSt
MS
Smart−card←−−−−−−−−{Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj}BSt
MS :
{
Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x
}
C. SYSTEM LOGIN PHASE
When any user wishes to use MS to sense data in an appro-
priate network, then the user should insert a valid smart-card
into the terminal to enter the credentials, such as identity PIDj
and secret-key SKj. The execution flows are as follows:
Step 1: The smart-card SC determines TS∗j = Vj ⊕
H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
))
and H∗j = H2
(
TS∗j
)
to verify
whether H∗j is equal to Hj or not. If the equality holds, then
MS executes the subsequent steps. Otherwise, SC requests the
user to provide the proper credentials, such as user identity
and secret key.
Step 2: The smart-card determines a random-integer value
rNj to determine the following:
bj = H2
(
TS∗j ‖ rNj
)
⊕ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
);
cj = H2
(
Aj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
) ‖ rNj),
then the mobile-sink sends the message-request{
PIDj, bj, cj, rNj
}
to BSt via secure common channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message
{
PIDj, bj, cj, rNj
}
from smart-card, BSt performs the computation
A∗j = H2
(
PIDj‖ x ‖ y
);
Dj = bj ⊕ H2
(
H2
(
PIDj‖ x
) ‖ rNj) = H2 (x⊕ SKj);
c∗j = H2
(
A∗j ‖ Dj‖ rNj
)
.
After computation, BSt verifies whether c∗j = cj or not.
If the equality holds, then BSt determines MS as a legal
mobile-sink to compute
Qj = H2
((
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
)) ‖ rNj),
MKeˆ
(
S.H1
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
))
, ppub
)
, and
CLCDBS = EMK
(
LCDBS
)
.
Lastly, BSt sends the computation parameters
{
Qj,CLCDBS
}
to MS.
Step 4:Upon receiving the parameters
{
Qj,CLCDBS
}
from
BSt, MS determines Q∗j = H2
((
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
)) ‖ rNj)
to verify whether Q∗j = Qj or not. If the equation holds,
then MS computes MK = eˆ
(
certj, ppub
)
and LCDBS =
DMK
(
CLCDBS
)
, where DMK is the decryption of EMK (.).
After the successful computation, MS stores the updated
list of legal cluster heads LCDBS into its storage memory.
Upon the successful of LCDBS , MS retains the complete
database of legal cluster heads to run the subsequent step
to ensure the authentication during message transmission.
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Moreover, to obtain the legal cluster head, the above steps
are periodically executed.
The steps of system login phase can be presented as:
SC determines:
{
TS∗j = Vj ⊕ H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
))
H∗j = H2
(
TS∗j
)
if H∗j 6= Hj then
SC
requests−−−−−→
PIDj, SKj
user
else
SC determines rNj :
{
bj = H2
(
TS∗j ‖ rNj
)
⊕ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
)
cj = H2
(
Aj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
) ‖ rNj)
MS−−−−−−−−→{PIDj,bj,cj,rNj}BSt
A∗j = H2
(
PIDj‖ x ‖ y
)
Dj = bj ⊕ H2
(
H2
(
PIDj‖ x
) ‖ rNj)=H2(x⊕ SKj)
c∗j = H2
(
A∗j ‖ Dj‖ rNj
)
 : BSt
if c∗j = cj then
MS :

Qj = H2
((
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
)) ‖ rNj)
MKeˆ
(
S.H1
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
))
, ppub
)
CLCDBS = EMK
(
LCDBS
)
 : BSt
MS←−−−−−−−−{
Qj,CLCDBS
} BSt
MS determines: Q∗j = H2
((
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x⊕ SKj
)) ‖ rNj)
if Q∗j = Qj then
MK = eˆ
(
certj, ppub
)
LCDBS = DMK
(
CLCDBS
)
D. SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Once the system login phase is completed successfully, MS
can move into theWSN’s coverage area to collect the sensing
data. In order to authenticate its communication with CH j,
MS has the procedural executions, which are as follows:
Step 1: While MS actuates its current vicinity into CH j,
it transmits its connection-request to nearby CH j for user
authentication.
Step 2: After receiving the connection-request, CH j sends
its unique identity of CIDj to the requested mobile-sink.
Step 3: Upon receiving the CIDj, MS verifies the legit-
imacy of CH j using the un-compromised cluster database
table LCDBS . If CH j is found as legal, then MS generates the
following:Ht = H2 (TSS);m1 = Ht .H1(PIDj ‖ H2(x⊕SK j);
and 1j = eˆ
(
Certifyj.Ht .H1
(
CIDj
))
. Then, the mobile-sink
sends the message-request
{
m1,1j,TSS
}
toCH j. Eventually,
the mobile-sink determines an initial session key SK1 =
eˆ(Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
) as a secret-session key.
Step 4: After the successful computation of
{
m1,1j,Ht
}
,
CH j verifies whether TSS − TSC ≤ 1TS, where TSC is the
current timestamp of CH j message transmission and 1TS is
the expected transmission delay.
If the delay interval is permissible, then CH j determines
Ht = H2 (TSS) and 1∗j = eˆ
(
Certifyj.Ht .H1
(
CIDj
))
to check whether 1∗j = 1j or not. If the equation holds,
then CH j identifiesMS to be legitimate. To create a common
session key, CH j computes a final session key
Sk2 = eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
and
∇ = H2
(
Sk1 ‖ PIDj ‖ CIDj ‖ TSS
)
and then sends the message parameter {∇,TSS} to MS.
To verify the identical in session key, MS computes the
equation that is as follows:
Sk2 = eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
= eˆ (Ht .H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)) , Ht .r.H1 (CIDj)
= eˆ (Ht .r.H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)) , Ht .H1 (CIDj)
= eˆ (Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1 (CIDj)) = SK1
Step 5: Once the message parameter {∇,TSS} is
received from CH j, MS determines Verify = H2(
Sk1 ‖ PIDj ‖ CIDj ‖ TSS
)
to check whether it holds with
∇ or not. If the verification is successful,MS uses the session
key Sk1 to establish a session with CH j.
The steps of system authentication phase can be presented
as:
MS
connection−request−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CH j
CIDj←−−−
MS checks
CH j in LCDBS
if CH j is legal then
MS :

Ht = H2 (TSS)
m1 = Ht .H1(PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)
1j = eˆ
(
Certifyj.Ht .H1
(
CIDj
))
MS
message−request−−−−−−−−−−→{m1,1j,TSS} CH j
SK1 = eˆ(Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
)
TSS − TSC ≤ 1TS} : CH j
Ht = H2 (TSS)
1∗j = eˆ
(
Certifyj.Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)) } : CH j
if 1∗j = 1j then
MS
identifies←−−−−−−CH j
Computes
Sk2 = eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
∇ = H2
(
Sk1 ‖ PIDj ‖ CIDj ‖ TSS
) } : CH j
MS
{∇,TSS }←−−−−−CH j
Sk2 = eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
= eˆ (Ht .H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)), Ht .r.H1 (CIDj)
= eˆ (Ht .r.H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)), Ht .H1 (CIDj)
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= eˆ (Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1 (CIDj)) = SK1
MS:Verify
= H2
(
Sk1 ‖ PIDj ‖ CIDj ‖ TSS
)
E. EXTRACTION OF SENSING DATA
WhileMS is successfully established its communication with
CH j, it can read the sensing data from CH j. The processing
steps are as follows:
Step 1: Initially, CH j computes the cipher text CT j =
ESk2
(
Dataj
)
using the session key Sk2, where Dataj is the
internal storage data of CH j. Lastly, CH j sends the parameter
CT j to MS.
Step 2: After receiving the parameter CT j from CH , MS
determines CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
CT j
))
to stores its corre-
sponding values in internal storage device or sends the value
to BSt directly, where MK = eˆ
(
cert j, ppub
)
. The aforesaid
equation may be inferred as: CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
CT j
)) =
CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
ESk2
(
Dataj
))) = EMK (Dataj).
Hence, the verification proves that the storage data of MS is
encrypted by MK .
Step 3: After successful verification, MS sends the trans-
mission message
{
PIDj,CDataj, bj, cj, rNj
}
to BSt, where
bj, cj and rNj are computed in system login phase.
Step 4:Upon receiving the transmission message fromMS,
BSt tries to extract PIDj to compute the equations, which are
as follows: A∗j = H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
; Dj = H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
and
c∗j = H2
(
A∗j ‖ Dj ‖ rNj
)
.
After the successful computation, BSt verifies whether
c∗j = cj or not. If the equation holds, then BSt deter-
mines MS to be a legitimate. Then, BSt determines MK =
eˆ
(
S.H1
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
))
, ppub
)
to decrypt the storage-
data DMK
(
Dataj
) = DMK (EMK (Dataj)) = Dataj. After
decryption of storage data, BSt is allowed to extract the
sensing data Dataj from MS.
The following diagram shows extraction of sensing data.
CT j = ESk2
(
Dataj
)} : CH j
MS
CT j←− CH j
MS determines
CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
CT j
))
MS
MK=eˆ(cert j,ppub)
sends−−−−−−−−−−−→BSt
CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
CT j
)) = CDataj
= EMK
(
DSk1
(
ESk2
(
Dataj
))) = EMK (Dataj)
MS
{PIDj,CDataj,bj,cj,rNj}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→BSt
A∗j = H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
Dj = H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
c∗j = H2
(
A∗j ‖ Dj ‖ rNj
)
 : BSt
if c∗j = cj then BSt determines MS
MK = eˆ
(
S.H1
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
))
, ppub
)
DMK
(
Dataj
) = DMK (EMK (Dataj)) = Dataj
F. SECRET KEY UPDATE PHASE
In this phase, User can modify his / her secret key when he
/ she wants to change. The procedural steps of key update
phase are as follows:
Step 1: User tries to enter his / her smart card into the user
terminal to verify the credentials, such as PIDj and SK j.
Step 2: After the successful entries, the smart card com-
putes TS∗j = Ver j ⊕ H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
))
and H∗j =
H2
(
TS∗j
)
to verify whether H∗j = Hj or not. If the equation
holds, then User is permitted to change his /her secret key
SK newj and x
new. Otherwise, the smart card disapproves the
request of User . Lastly, MS sends the transmission mes-
sage
{
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
)
,Ver j,H2
(
xnew ⊕ SK newj
)}
to
BSt through secure communication channel.
Step 3: After receiving the transmission message{
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
)
,Ver j,H2
(
xnew ⊕ SK newj
)}
from MS,
BSt determines Ver∗j = H2
(
PIDj ‖ y
)
⊕ H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
))
to verify whether Ver∗j =
Ver j or not. If the equation holds, then BSt performs a compu-
tation of certnewj = r .H1
(
PIDj
) ‖ H2 (xnew ⊕ SK newj ) and
Vernewj = H2
(
PIDj ‖ y
)⊕H2 (PIDj ‖ H2 (xnew ⊕ SK newj )).
Then, BSt sends the computation message
{
certnewj ,Ver
new
j
}
to MS through a secure communication channel.
Step 4: After receiving the message
{
certnewj ,Ver
new
j
}
from BSt, the smart card modifies the parameters, such as
cert j, verf j and x into cert
new
j ,Ver
new
j and x
new in the given
order.
The following illustrative diagram shows secret key update
phase.
User verify the credentials PIDj and SK j
TS∗j = Ver j ⊕ H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
))
H∗j = H2
(
TS∗j
) } : smart card
if H∗j = Hj then
User is permitted to change his /her secret key SK newj and
xnew
MS
{
PIDj‖H2(x⊕SKj),Ver j,H2
(
xnew⊕SKnewj
)}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ BSt
Ver∗j = H2
(
PIDj ‖ y
)⊕ H2 (PIDj ‖ H2 (x ⊕ SKj))} : BSt
if Ver∗j = Ver j then
certnewj =r .H1
(
PIDj
) ‖ H2 (xnew ⊕ SK newj )
Vernewj =H2
(
PIDj ‖y
)⊕H2(PIDj ‖H2(xnew ⊕ SK newj ))
: BSt
MS
{
certnewj ,Ver
new
j
}
−−−−−−−−−−→ BSt
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TABLE 2. Important notation used in BAN logic.
MSmodifies :
{
cert j, verf j = certnewj ,Vernewj
x = xnew
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section is composed of stringent formal and informal
security analysis of S-SAKA. The analysis result shows that
the proposed S-SAKA framework not only offers security
properties of authentication protocols for mutual authentica-
tion, session-key agreement and data confidentiality, but also
prevents the various potential attacks, such as node-capture,
stolen smart-card, key impersonation and privileged-insider.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
S-SAKA framework offers secret session-key agreement
between a legal cluster head CH i, base station BS , smart
card SC and a mobile-sink MS i and it is proven using BAN
logic [19]. Assume thatX and Y be the principles,P and Q be
the statement / formula and sk be the secret key. The important
notation used in the BAN logic is given in Table 2.
The BAN logic postulates are as follows:
Rule 1 – Meaning of Messages: X |≡X
sk←→Y ,XG{P}sk
X |≡Y |∼P and
X |≡X Q←→Y ,XG{P}Q
X |≡Y |∼Q : If X trusts that sk is shared among X and Y
and perceives P encrypted with sk , then X trusts the Y as a
legal client.
Rule 2 – Verification of Nonce: X |≡6=P,X |≡Y |∼PX |≡Y |≡P and
X |≡6=Q,X |≡Y |∼Q
X |≡Y |≡Q : If X trusts that X has just been communi-
cated and thus Y ony perceives P, then X trusts that Y be
certain of P.
Rule 3 – Belief: X |≡PX |≡QX |≡(P,Q) : If X trusts P and Q, then X
beliefs in P and Q.
Rule 4 – Rule of Fresh-Concatenation: X |≡6=PX |≡6=(P,Q) : If X
trusts the freshness in key generation of P, then Y be certain
of freshness in (P,Q).
Rule 5 – Rule of Jurisdiction: X |≡Y⇒PX |≡Y |≡PX |≡(P,Q) : If X trusts
that Y has influence over P and X believes Y in the accuracy
of P, then X trusts in P.
To satisfy the security properties of AKA protocol, the pro-
posed S-SAKA framework must be able to meet all the test
goals, given in below.
Goal1 : MSi | ≡ BS | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
Goal2 : MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
Goal3 : SC | ≡ MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
Goal4 : SC | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
The structural flow of BAN logic is as follows:
1. Messages in Generic Form:
M1 : MSi→ BS : 〈H2(x ⊕ SKj)〉, 〈PIDj,H2(x ⊕ SKj〉x∈Z∗q
M2 : BS → SC : 〈Certifyj = S.H1(PIDj‖H2(x ⊕ SKj));
TSj = H2(PIDj‖y);Hj = H2(TSj);
Vj = TSj ⊕ H2(x ⊕ SKj));
Aj = H2(PIDj‖x‖y)〉x∈Z∗q
M3 : MSi → SC : 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x〉x∈Z∗q
2. Transmission of Messages in Idealized Form:
TM1 : MSi → BS : 〈PIDj,H2(x ⊕ SKj〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
TM2 : BS → SC : 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
TM3 : MSi → SC : 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
3. Messages in Hypotheses Form:
HM1 : MSi | ≡ 6= (CIDi), CH i| ≡6= (TS1,TS2)
HM2 : BS | ≡ 6= (PIDi), BS | ≡6= (TS3,TS4)
HM3 : MSi | ≡ BS | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
HM4 : MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
HM5 : SC | ≡ MS i| ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
HM6 : SC | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC
The idealized form of S-SAKA framework is examined on
the base of BAN logic postulates and goal settings. The key
proofs of S-SAKA are as follows:
- From the transmission message TM1, the S-SAKA has
P1 : BS G 〈PIDj,H2(x ⊕ SKj〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
.
- From HM2, P1 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires
P2 : BS | ≡ MSi | ∼ 〈PIDj,H2(x ⊕ SKj〉.
- From the transmission message TM2, the S-SAKA has
P3 : SC G 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
.
- From HM5, P3 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires
P4 : CH i| ≡ SC | ∼ 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj〉.
- From HM1,P4,Rule (2) and Rule (4), the S-SAKA
obtains P5 : MSi | ≡ BS | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC . 〈Goal1〉
- Try, from HM5,P5 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA gets
P6 : MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC . 〈Goal2〉
- From the transmission message TM3, the S-SAKA has
P7 : BS G 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x〉
MS i
PIDj−→BS
.
- From HM1, P7 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires
P8 : BS | ≡ MS i| ∼ 〈Certifyj,Vj,Hj,Aj, x〉.
- From HM5,P8,Rule (2) and Rule (4), the S-SAKA
obtains P9 : SC | ≡ MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC . 〈Goal3〉
- From HM4,P9 and Rule (3), the S-SAKA achieves
P10 : SC | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC . 〈Goal4〉
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- Again, from HM6, P10 and Rule (5), the S-SAKA pro-
duces P11 : MSi | ≡ CH i sk←→ SC 〈Goal2〉
Provided the goals 〈Goal1 − Goal4〉, the S-SAKA proto-
col asserts that it uses a shared secret-key sk to establish a
communication; and hence the proposed S-SAKA framework
is proficient to achieve the proper mutual authentication,
session-key agreement and confidentiality.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the informal security analysis of S-SAKA
protocol is performed inwhich the adversary has some unique
capabilities that are as follows:
1. The adversary is able to control over the communi-
cation channel especially with mobile-sink, cluster-
head and base-station to do message intercept, insert,
delete or modify any exchange of information.
2. The adversary may incur either user identity and secret
key or the storage information of smart card but he /
she cannot obtain both. For an instance, if the adversary
obtains the user identity and secret key, he / she can’t
have any chance to obtain the storage information of
smart card.
1) PROPER MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND
SESSION-KEY AGREEMENT
In the authentication phase, the cluster-headCH j and mobile-
sink authenticate each other by the verification of 1j =
eˆ(Certifyj.Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
) to validate the secret-session key
SK1 = eˆ(Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
). Using S.H1
(
CIDj
)
,
the cluster-head performs the computation, which is as fol-
lows:
eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
= eˆ (Ht .H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)) , S.H1 (CIDj)
= eˆ (S.H1 (PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j)) ,Ht .H1 (CIDj)
= eˆ (Certifyj,Ht .H1 (CIDj)) = 1j
On the other hand, the mobile-sink authenticates the
cluster-head using Ver j = ∇ to render the transmis-
sion message {∇,TSS}. As the certificate authorization
is given only for the authorized mobile-sink, the other
cannot infer / forge to generate a valid authentic key
value 1j. To establish a secure communication, the mobile-
sink and the cluster-head shares s session key SK1 =
eˆ(Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
).Hence, the S-SAKA framework
provides proper mutual authentication and session-key
agreement.
2) DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
In S-SAKA framework, to collect the sensing data, the
mobile-sink should try to achieve the proper mutual authen-
tication with cluster-head using shared session key. After the
establishment of session key, the mobile-sink can acquire the
sensing information through the knowledge of cluster-head.
As the shared session key is kept secretly between themobile-
sink and cluster-head, the adversary cannot deduce the Dataj
in plaintext. Thus, the S-SAKA framework claims that it can
provide a secure communication between themobile-sink and
the cluster-head.
On the one hand, the secret-session key SK1 =
eˆ(Ht .Certifyj,Ht .H1
(
CIDj
)
) is interfaced between the
cluster-head CH and the mobile-sink. On the other hand,
the cluster-head determines CDataj = EMK
(
DSk1
(
CT j
)) =
CDataj to save and send it to the base-station. Even if the
adversary acquires the information of mobile-sink, he / she
cannot infer Dataj as it could not obtain the key value of
MK . As the adversary cannot tamper the sensing-data without
knowledge of SK , the S-SAKA framework provides data-
confidentiality for users.
3) RESILIENT TO NODE-CAPTURE ATTACK
The resistance of node-capture attack can be measured effec-
tively with the elimination of network communication, which
are compromised by ′N ′ captured nodes directly [36]. Owing
to inattentive property of WSNs’, an adversary may capture
the information of sensor-node or cluster-head. For your
kind note, cluster-head has authentic identity CIDj and secret
key value S.H1
(
CIDj
)
in initialization phase. Consequently,
the adversary may have a chance to compromise the nodes,
which are yet to communicate with mobile-sink and cluster-
head. But then, the nodes, which are not compromised are
still secure to establish the communication between mobile-
sink and cluster-head. Subsequently, the S-SAKA framework
claims that the adversary cannot provide any security disrup-
tion for uncompromised cluster-head and mobile-sink.
According to [42] and [43], the mobile-sink owner can
deduce the recent updated cluster-head from LCDBS database,
as soon as he / she has successfully logged into the
base-station. Similarly, the mobile-sink can identify the com-
promised cluster-head timely to reject the compromised
cluster-head. The un-compromised database table DBS is
associated with the mobile-sink securely; and thus the
adversary cannot affect / damage the secure communica-
tion between the cluster-head and mobile-sink. Hence, the
S-SAKA framework is resilient to node-capture attack.
4) RESILIENT TO STOLEN SMART-CARD ATTACK
Assume that adversary obtains the smart-card of the user
MS i; and thus he / she acquires the details of Certifyj =
S.H1(PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
), TSj = H2(PIDj ‖ y), Hj =
H2(TSj), Vj = TSj ⊕ H2(x ⊕ SKj)), Aj = H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
.
But then, the adversary can not deduce the users’ unique
identity PIDj and secret-key SKj from Certifyj,Vj,Hj and Aj
owing to one-way property of the hash function H1 (.) and
H2 (.). Therefore, the adversary cannot compute a precise
m1 = Ht .H1(PIDj ‖ H2(x ⊕ SK j) to form a valid request
message
{
m1,1j,TSS
}
. Therefore, the S-SAKA claims that
it is resilient to stolen smart-card attack.
5) RESILIENT TO REPLAY ATTACK
Using replay attack, the adversary uses a falsified authentica-
tion process to acquire the system access. In order to deduce
such false assumption, the S-SAKA uses timestamp TSS .
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Assume an adversary wishes to launch a replay attack to
infer the sensing data from cluster head CH . To extract
the sensed data, the adversary needs to send an authentic
message to CH . If the message
{
m∗1,1∗j ,TS∗s
}
is found
to be expired or already used by another mobile-sink MS,
CH determines to be a susceptible behavior. Even though,
the adversary changes the timestamp TS∗s , he / she cannot find
a proper 1∗j without the key parameter of Bst value S.
On the other hand, an adversary may wish to launch a
replay attack to intercept with authentic mobile-sink MS.
To establish the communication, the adversary need to gen-
erate an authentic message {∇,TSS}. As the key parameter
of Bst value S is always kept secret between MS and Bst ,
the adversary cannot determine a valid secret session key
Sk2 = eˆ
(
m1,Ht .r.H1
(
CIDj
))
. Hence, the S-SAKA claims
that the adversary cannot launch a replay attack without the
proper computation of ∇ = H2
(
Sk1 ‖ PIDj ‖ CIDj ‖ TSS
)
.
This proves that the S-SAKA framework is resilient to replay
attack.
6) RESILIENT TO KEY IMPERSONATION ATTACK
By using this attack, an adversary provides a forged informa-
tion
{
m∗1,1∗j ,TS∗s
}
to impersonate as a legitimate mobile-
sink MS as to overhear the sensing information. However,
the adversary cannot infer / forge 1∗j without the determina-
tion of Certifyj. According to DL problem, it is very much
difficult to derive the secret key parameter S using P and
ppub. As a result, the adversary cannot determine S.H1(PIDj ‖
H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
) = Certifyj and1∗j . The above analysis proves
that S-SAKA framework is resilient to key impersonation
attack.
7) RESILIENT TO PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In the system registration phase of S-SAKA framework, the
mobile-sink owner User does not share his/her secret key
SK j in plaintext form. But, he / she shares its information
as H2(x ⊕ SK j) to Bst . As H2 (.) is a one-way point secure
hashing function, it is computationally not possible to obtain
SK j. Moreover, the administrator or privileged Bst cannot
determine a valid SK j of User and thus he / she cannot
impersonate as a legal user User to communicate with CH .
Hence, the S-SAKA framework claims to be secure against
the privileged-insider attack.
8) USER ANONYMITY AND INTRACTABILITY
In the system authentication phase, the S-SAKA frame-
work uses mobile-sink MS to send the transmission message{
m1,1j,TSS
}
to cluster-head CH in turn to obtain a proper
user authentication. As eachmessage transmission has unique
time stamp TSS that traverses between MS and CH , there
will be no correlation of two authentic messages, namely{
m1,1j,TSS
}
and
{
m∗1,1∗j ,TS∗s
}
. Moreover, as the message
transmission has one way point to map hashing function,
it is much difficult to retrieve PIDj from m1. Hence, the
S-SAKA framework claims that the adversary cannot identify
any authentic mobile-sink or communication link launched
by the same mobile-sink.
9) RESILIENT TO OFFLINE PASSWORD-GUESSING ATTACK
This attack is categorized into two cases that are as follows:
Case 1: Assume an insider wishes to know the infor-
mation of legitimate user, such as user identity PIDj and
secret-key SK j during system registration. The registration
request of insider {PIDj, SK j)} is sent securely to the base-
station. Besides, the insider has a smart-card, which are stolen
from User . Even though he has the device access and user
information, he / she could not derive a proper secret session
key without the knowledge of secret key value x.
Case 2: Assume an outsider has stolen the smart-card of
User . As a consequence, he / she can extract all the confi-
dential information of smart-card, such as
{
PIDj, bj, cj, rNj
}
,
where
bj = H2
(
TS∗j ‖ rNj
)
⊕ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
,
cj = H2
(
Aj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
) ‖ rNj).
To derive a secret key SK j, the outsider needs to know
secret key value x, which is a bilinear parameter correspond-
ing to Z∗p . As it is controlled and changed its value peri-
odically by the base-station, the outsider cannot guess the
proper secret key SK j to gain the User access.
The above analysis proves that the proposed S-SAKA
framework can be resilient to offline password-guessing
attack.
10) RESILIENT TO DoS ATTACK
Without proper user identity PIDj and secret key SK j,
none of the user can successfully log in to the systems.
Even if they have stolen the smart card of legitimate
user, they can infer the information like
{
PIDj, bj, cj, rNj
}
,
where bj = H2
(
TS∗j ‖ rNj
)
⊕ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
, cj =
H2
(
Aj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
) ‖ rNj). After that, the smart-card ver-
ifies whether H∗j = H2
(
TS∗j
)
is valid or not, where
Hj = H2(TSj), TSj = H2(PIDj ‖ y) and TS∗j =
Vj ⊕ H2
(
PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SKj
))
. As the timestamp TS j and
secret value x periodically changes, they cannot derive a
proper secret key SKj to gain the user access. Hence, the pro-
posed S-SAKA framework is resilient to denial of service
attack.
11) RESILIENT TO MANY LOGGED-IN USERS WITH THE
SAME LOGIN IDENTITY ATTACK
In the proposed S-SAKA framework, the user must provide
valid credentials {PIDj, SK j)} to obtain the access of cluster-
head through the knowledge of base-station, which verifies
the secret value x to authorize the service access. As the
secret value x is unique toUser and controlled by base-station,
the user redundancy cannot be determined using following
expressions: Certifyj = S.H1(PIDj ‖ H2
(
x ⊕ SK j
)
); TSj =
H2(PIDj ‖ y); Hj = H2(TSj); Vj = TSj ⊕ H2(x ⊕ SKj));
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TABLE 3. Comparison of communication efficiencies during system login and authentication phase.
Aj = H2
(
PIDj ‖ x ‖ y
)
as it is already in use. Hence, the
proposed S-SAKA framework claim that it is resilient to
many to many logged-in users with the same login identity
attack.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the proposed S-SAKA framework is evaluated
and compared with its related authentication schemes. The
evaluation criteria of communication cost, some notation is
defined as follows:
TSH is defined as the execution time of one-way secure
hashing function H2 (.) .TMH is defined as the execution time
of one-way point to map hashing function H1 (.).
TP is defined as the computation time of bilinear pairing
function.
TA is defined as the execution time of one-point additional
operational function.
TED is defined as the execution time of encryption and
decryption algorithmic function.
TM is defined as the execution time of elliptic-curve scalar
multiplication function.
In WSNs, energy efficiency is a major constraint and thus
lightweight user authentication protocols are preferred to
mitigate the computational cost of the systems.
In order to reduce the amount of computations required,
the proposed S-SAKA protocol uses cost inexpensive opera-
tions like hashing function and less cost expensive operation,
such as bilinear pairing, encryption/decryption and scalar
multiplication operation. To evaluate the cryptographic oper-
ations employed, an extensive verification is performed using
MIRACLE C/C++ library with the system features of 32-bit
Windows 7 Operating Systems and Microsoft Visual C++.
To examine realistically, the execution time of symmetric
key encryption/decryption (AES − 128), elliptic-curve point
scalar multiplication over finite-field fp and SHA− 1 hashing
function are set as TP ≈ 0.0001 ms,TED ≈ 0.1303 ms,
TM ≈ 7.3529 ms and TSH ≈ TMH ≈ 0.0004 ms as
referred in [22]. Table 3 demonstrates the communication
efficiencies of the proposed S-SAKA and its related existing
authentication schemes [17]–[22] during system login and
authentication phase. Results show that, the computation cost
of the bilinear pairing and scalar multiplication of proposed
S-SAKA is comparatively short.
The examination results prove that the proposed S-SAKA
has less communication overhead as it does not invoke the
base-station to authenticate the mobile-sink and sensor node
except during the secure communication establishment to
provide seamless connectivity. Thus, it can be well suitable
for WSN’s environment in relation with the existing authen-
tication schemes [17]–[22].
Table 3 compares the communication overhead involved
in system login and authentication phases for proposed
and other existing schemes [17]–[22]. While using SHA-1
hashing, the one-way hash function is assumed to be
160 − bits [20 bytes]. In addition, for each random nonce,
the identity of sensor node is set to be 152 − bits [19 bytes].
In proposed S-SAKA, during system login phase, the login
message transmission request TMsg1 =
{
PIDj, bj, cj, rNj
}
and TMsg2 =
{
Qj,CLCDBS
}
involves 78 bytes and 39 bytes
respectively. In the course of system authentication and key
agreement phase, the message transmission request TMsg3 ={
m1,1j,TSS
}
and TMsg4 =
{
PIDj,CDataj, bj, cj, rNj
}
encompasses 58 bytes and 98 bytes. As a result, during system
login and authentication phase, the communication overhead
is cumulated as follows: [78+ 39+ 58+ 98] = 273bytes.
On the other hand, the communication overheads involved
in system login and authentication phases for Deebak [17],
Turkanović et al. [18], Farash et al. [19], Das et al. [20],
Amin and Biswas [21] and Srinivas et al. [22] are calculated
as 315 bytes, 489 bytes, 434 bytes, 391 bytes, 373 bytes
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TABLE 4. Assertion threshold test values.
FIGURE 2. S-SAKA response with different 1g settings.
and 353 bytes respectively. It is observed that the pro-
posed S-SAKA scheme provides less communication over-
head in comparison with other existing authentication
schemes [17]–[22].
Although the computation and execution times of mobile
sink, cluster head and base stations are lower than the pro-
posed protocol, total execution time in term of millisec-
onds the proposed S-SAKA performs lowest time. It is also
remarked that S-SAKA can divide the protected resources
in IoT-based environments into a number of assertion levels
(= n). Assuming a total count of assertion levels n equal
to 3, threshold values of the assertion levels can be as shown
in Table 4.
gti ∈ [0, 1] and represents the assertion level threshold
value of the ith assertion level that can be calculated by
gti = (i − 1) ∗ 1n . gti reflects how confident the S-SAKA
system must be about a user in order to assert his/her identity
before granting access to them. It defines a control parameter
representing the rate of change of the assertion value and
referred to as 1g. This parameter can be used to control
the speed by which the assertion value in safety-inspired
applications’ increases or decreases.
Changing the value of 1g affects how the system con-
fidence is about a user access as shown in Fig. 2. In this
figure when 1g is set to values between 0.1 and 0.5, the
S-SAKA system confidence increases slowly and needs at
least 6 events for the global assertion value to reach the next
threshold value. This setting would be useful in IoT environ-
ments, where high security levels are a must such as the case
in safety-inspired applications. However, when 1g has high
values such 0.7 to 1.0, the system confidence risesmuch faster
with less number of events to reach the second level; this
setting would be useful for more relaxed IoT environments.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, WSN security schemes are considered in terms
of authentication and secure key agreement, which can be
essential particularly for the IoT applications for public safety
applicationswith cloud interactions. Enhancement of security
framework can be essential for public safety paradigm since
the IoT systems can be used for communication of sensitive
information. Addressing the potential security based chal-
lenges, Seamless secure authentication and key agreement
(S-SAKA) framework using bilinear-pairing and elliptic-
curve cryptosystems has been proposed for the secu-
rity issues, like data confidentiality, mutual authentication,
session-key agreement, user anonymity, intractability and
resilient to node-capture, key impersonation, password guess-
ing and stolen smart-card attack. While using mobile-sink in
WSNs, the S-SAKA framework does not only solve some
major security issues, but also ensures a seamless connectiv-
ity to reduce the computation and communication cost of the
network systems. In terms of authentication and authoriza-
tion, recent studies on formal verifications that are based on
bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems [44] are not
provided forWSNs. As stated earlier, considering life-time of
WSN, security aspects are critical and new solutions should
be provided effectively and efficiently. The formal verifica-
tion method and critical analyses performed prove that pro-
posed S-SAKA provides mutual authentication, secure key
agreement and data confidentiality. Furthermore, the results
of performance evaluation show the reduced overhead of the
proposed approach compared to the existing studies. Thus,
the proposed S-SAKA framework can be well suited to the
environments where public safety networks make use of IoT
based applications with wireless sensors networks.
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